Pervasive Monitoring

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IETF (Re)Action

• Overall: snowdonia has re-energised folks to do better on security and privacy in general (and not solely in response to PM)
  – Side meeting in Berlin @ IETF-87
  – Tech plenary, major discussion @ IETF-88
  – Topic at many meetings/BoFs @ IETF-89
  – W3C-IAB workshop before IETF-89
  – Wanting to see results from IETF-90 onwards...

• Unsurprisingly this is similar to the more broad technical community reaction
Completed IETF Actions

- UTA WG formed, update BCPs on how to use TLS in applications
  - WG has to do work now of course
- draft-farrell-perpass-attack BCP in RFC editor queue after major IETF LC debate – sets the basis for further actions
- BoFs at IETF-89: DNS Privacy and TCP encryption
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High-Level Observations

• IETF will not have an opinion about surveillance as such, but we must understand the dangers and evolve the technology
• Address PM just like we generally address security
• We have said that we will address PM - need to deliver on promise
• Good things are happening in the world re: more security being turned on
• Also good IETF discussions (UTA, TLS, HTTP)
• But of course, securing the Internet beyond these is hard...
Pervasive Monitoring
Backup Slides

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It's an attack

- The actions of NSA and their partners (nation-state or corporate, coerced or not) are a multi-faceted form of attack, or are indistinguishable from that

- Not unique, others are likely doing the same... or will

- The scale arguably makes this an example of a new pervasive monitoring threat model that is neither purely passive nor a classic Man-in-the-Middle and that we have not normally considered in protocol design, implementation or deployment

- A purely technical response will not “solve the problem” but we should treat an attack as we usually do and try mitigate it
Contents

• What is pervasive monitoring?
• Who's been a naughty TLA then?
• What's wrong with this picture?
• What can we rationally do?

• Bored and prefer video?
  - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oV71hhEpQ20
  - 2.5 hours though:-)
A Definition

Pervasive Monitoring (PM) is widespread (and often covert) surveillance through intrusive gathering of protocol artefacts, including application content, or protocol meta-data such as headers. Active or passive wiretaps and traffic analysis, (e.g., correlation, timing or measuring packet sizes), or subverting the cryptographic keys used to secure protocols can also be used as part of pervasive monitoring. PM is distinguished by being indiscriminate and very large-scale, rather than by introducing new types of technical compromise.

Aspects of PM

• Non-targeted, attempts to catch “all” traffic/users, perhaps within some application/protocol/geographic scope
  – Targeted monitoring is different and is sometimes justifiable according to most people, though there are vast differences in opinion as to how to do that acceptably (see also RFC2804)

• PM is neither a classic active nor passive attack
  – Active attack on DNS/HTTP might be used to determine target for passive attack (QUANTUMINSERT)
  – Passive attack on SSH might be used to determine target for active attack (“We target sysadmins”)

• I talk about PM as “an” attack but as we'll see it really involves a whole plethora of different, mostly well known techniques used in a co-ordinated manner
Attack Summary

• Attacks don't respect network layers but those are still useful, so let's look at things roughly from bottom (h/w) up the layers
  - We DO NOT KNOW what exactly has been done
  - Most of the media stories are not specific enough for our purposes
  - Much of this rests on speculation
• Hard to keep an up to date timeline...
Low Level Stuff

- Doping h/w from various places in production
- Dual_EC_DRBG
  - http://dual-ec.org/
- Other (P)RNG code in kernels etc. often unsafe
- Stuxnet/Flame: different motive but similar modus-operandi
- Even more paranoid: compromised crypto APIs might leak key bits through use of IVs that appear random but are actually related to application data encryption key
Mid-Level Stuff

- **Tempora**
  - [http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa](http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa)

- **PRISM**

- **XKEYSCORE**
  - [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data)

- **Phone records**

- **Financial records**

- **Email records**
High-ish Level Stuff

- MitM attacks on popular web sites (collaborating PKI?)
  - https://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=15579
- Directed breaches of ISP/provider n/w in Belgacom
- Meta-data vs. data
  - http://www.theguardian.com/technology/interactive/2013/jun/12/what-is-metadata-nsa-surveillance
- Databases of passwords, secret and private keys, incl. Kerberos!
  - reports on programme, from which some screenshots were posted...
  - http://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/nsa-brazil-4.png (last bullet says “Results can frequently be verified using Kerberos etc. data”)
- “Tor stinks”
- Optic Nerve – GCHQ watching Yahoo video
  - “a surprising number of people use webcam conversations to show intimate parts of their body”
Higher Level Stuff

• “Legal” compulsion
  - http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/12/microsoft-twitter-rivals-nsa-requests

• Corporate collusion
  - (non-objective:-)
Highest Level Stuff

- Damage to reputation of Internet
- Damage to reputation of US & partners and for any government capable of this kind of attack
- The attack is highly unlikely to stop and highly likely to get worse as others join in
- Damage to IETF processes – how many IETFers could you get for a chunk of $250M per year?
  - There is damage to people sponsored by attackers, even if all of those are entirely good-actors (which afaik they are)
- Nation-state level reactions (Brazil etc) can damage themselves and the Internet
- All the usual players (or wannabe players) in Internet governance will try benefit from this situation
Silly, silly TLAs

• Getting caught is really really bad
  – If you are going to do PM, then not getting caught is an absolute requirement
  – With 1,000,000 people cleared to see something, how secret can it ever be? Scaling might help here

• Most country's signals intelligence agencies ostensibly have a dual purpose – to spy/snoop and to help protect their nation, e.g. with “cybersecurity” expertise
  – The former is damaging to the latter it seems
Why is PM “bad”? 

- Up to you to answer that, possible answers:
  - It's a technical attack, same as any other
  - Chilling effects – leads to self-censorship
  - Potential for holder of DB to exercise undue influence, think DDR (former East Germany)
  - Creates and pumps a market for zero-day attacks
  - Data will leak out eventually
  - Privacy is a human right
  - Assumption behind is guilt-by-association fallacy
  - Everyone has something to hide, some of the time
  - I didn't give you permission
Why is PM (said to be) “good”?

• Up to you to answer that:
  – If targeted surveillance is agreed as a good, then how do you find out who to target?
  – Asymmetric threat model, “terrorism”
  – The public want it and don't really care (cf. Facebook, gmail)
  – Telecommunications has always been monitored to the maximum extent feasible and this is just the same
  – We're not looking, and copying/storing is not “collecting”
  – Network administrators need to see plaintext to manage their networks according to the legitimate policies for that
A tiny bit of IETF history

• 1990's: Crypto wars
  - RFC 1984
• 2000's: wiretap/lawful interception
  - RFC 2804
• Today:
  - In RFC editor queue
What to do? (1)

• Turn on crypto
  – For applications and between data-centres
  – Current tools: TLS, IPsec, IEEE MAC-sec, DNSSEC
  – Future tools?: DNS-priv, tcpcrypt, MPLS-OE
    • Discussions ongoing

• Data minimisation
  – E.g. DNS QNAME minimisation
  – More uncertain, more to learn here
What to do? (2)

● Better implementations
  – https://cryptech.is/ and similar
  – Update/check crypto support
  – Make security/privacy admin easier

● Deployments
  – Turn on stuff that helps privacy
  – Significant issues with business models and deployed base of services

● Users
  – Target diversity
  – Don't all use the same services all the time
What to do? (3)

• Discuss the issue openly
  – In whatever fora are relevant for you
• Agitate (if that's your kind of thing)
• Go and be responsible engineers/computer scientists/whatever and take the broader implications of your work/research into account before while and after doing it
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    - Including by me, as ack'd at mic @ IETF-88, bummer
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IETF as Part of Problem/Solution

- IETF and broader (re)actions need to note that we are part of the problem as well as part of the solution
  - Whether due to BULLRUN or not, we have made it too hard to use secure protocol variants and we could have done better
- Personally (i.e. not consensus IETF position):
  - My guess is BULLRUN was hugely ineffective, but may have had some minor impact
  - Much more likely: Large complex organisations setting complex requirements and lack of deployment experience meant we made non-optimal engineering choices (over complex mainly, “gold-plating”)
  - We can and will do better though, with confidence for that being largely based on significantly large real deployments – that will force us to do the right thing
- Reminder: BULLRUN == US$250M/year to make Internet security worse